3 of 7 Ways We Are Deluding Ourselves

When it is put that way, that can seem like we safety officers are under a lot of pressure. And in some ways, we are. And sometimes, we tend to find ways to take  some pressure off by trying to delegate safety cncerns to workers, instead of us taking all of our time checking everything ourselves. We try to give our workers responsibility and accountability for safety issues, in the hopes that warning signs can be noted and reported on quickly beforean incident occurs. But while that seems noble from one context, it does lead to other questions – such as, what is the culture of the office surrounding safety? Is the focus of the company or the worksite managers built on production, and any lack of production to account for safety is discouraged or flat-out ignored by supervisors? Are workers truly encouraged to identify safety risks and report them, and are those reports followed up promptly?

And of course, there can be another 20-30 questions which can come out of these that could shape your individual worksite culture, and whether safety is truly  the priority. Some research conducted by Corrie Pitzer, who has an article in the April 2015 issue of Professional Safetymagazine, played off these questions regarding workplace safety culture and revealed seven “delusions” about safety. These are delusion because they are believed and not actually backed up by facts – for example, there can be delusion of safety at a plant only because no reports of safety concerns were addressed or filed; when the facts are that there may very well be extensive safety risks if only a safety professional conducted an actual audit of the worksite. This blog post will address the first thee of the seven delusions that Pitzer identified  from her research. Tuesday, we will look into the other four delusions, and the next couple posts will address the seven related realities and give tools to help reconcile the delusion with the reality.

Delusion #1: No Risk Reports, Few Causes for Concern

Pitzer identifies this delusion as especially common in organizations where there are zero or near-zero incident cultures. In these situations, there is often not enough data available to make an informed guess about risk assessment of various protocols and operations, and thus there is a delusion that there is no risk or that the risk can be minimal or minimized.

Delusion #2: To Comply is to Be Safe

While this delusion is generally true, the delusion goes beyond just simple compliance with all safety procedures. This goes to the delusion that if you have everyone trained to such a point that they can’t think for themselves and do a self-assessment of risk in a particular situation, then sticking to the safety procedure blindly can cost lives. One great example of this came in November 1988 when the Piper Alpha oil rig in the North Sea exploded, killing 167 people. In the aftermath, it was revealed that most of those killed stuck to the safety protocols at the time, which stated that all those on the rig were to gather in an “accommodation unit” above the platform. Most of those people were killed due to smoke inhalation. Meanwhile, those who deviated from the protocol and jumped off the rig into the water, actually were the ones who survived. Why? They were able to judge the situation and made a call based on the information at hand, making the decision that while jumping off the rig was risky, there was a better chance of survival than being right above a fire where smoke could gather. Not all safety protocols will account for every contingency, so it is important not to get caught up in making sure your protocols are followed to the “T” every time. As soon as you think you have every contingency accounted for, a new one will pop up.

Delusion #3: Being Consistent and Routine

One thing about human nature is that it is inherently unpredictable. Risks to humans can also be dynamic and sometimes hard to predict. Often as safety professionals, we will “blame” workers for many of the incidents because they like to deviate from certain norms. So, we will often put in very strict controls and regulations on worker behaviors so as to theoretically minimize risk. In other words, if we teach and train ourworkers to do their job exactly the same way every time, every day so that they aren’t doing risky things, then the risk won’t appear. But as we all know, every single day is different from the one before it. This can be another version of developing an unthinking, robotic workforce; a worker may note a risk, but if he or she is regulated into sticking to a particular routine that may essentially play right into that risk, then being a little too consistent couild result in trouble. Maybne this one day it is  not about the worker, but about the equipment; an unthinking worker will just go about the business he or she has always known, while one who can self-assess and has the freedom and capacity to analyze a situation, may be able to adjust the routine just enough to avoid the risk until the risk can be actively addressed and eliminated.